In the UK we must comply with UK law, not EU directives.
ATEX 95 Directive
In March 1994 the European Parliament and the Council adopted the New Approach Directive 94/9/EC on the approximation of the laws of member States concerning equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres -the ATEX Directive. Ratified under Article IOOa 1 , the main objectives of the Directive are to guarantee the freedom of movement of goods whilst ensuring a high level of protection against explosions.
However, this was not the first step towards technical hannonisation in this sector. For over twenty years there have been a number of Directives which have sought to guarantee free trade within Europe and these continue to remain valid until the ATEX Directive becomes mandatory from 1 July 2003.
These original specifications split the sector into two distinct product types -electrical equipment for use in mines or those surface parts of mines that may be affected by firedamp and electrical equipment for industrial applications other than mines. The fonner is covered by the socalled "Gassy Mines" Directive 82/130/EECl whilst the latter is provisioned for in 76/117/EEC and 79/196/EEC (the latter called the "first specific" Directive 3 ).
The certification procedures under these Old Approach Directives are nearly identical. The main principles are that:
• the scope is limited to electrical equipment which meet a set of well-defined protection requirements; • they refer to hannonised standards, drawn up by CEN-ELEC, the European Electrotechnical Standardisation Committee, and adopted by a committee of Member States' representatives;
• the manufacturer is allowed, after having obtained a certificate of conformity or an inspection certificate by a certification body, to affix the distinctive Community mark of confonnity, the well-known Epsilon-X mark in a hexagon, to the equipment.
These Directives have worked well over their years of operation, and their application has been widely recognised both in Europe and elsewhere, but it is clear that there have been problems, in particular:
• the fact that a change in legislation has been required each time standards have been updated and, as a consequence, manufacturers have not been able to access the latest editions for some time after their publication; • their restricted application to electrical equipment; • the lapse time to incorporate the latest understanding of the risk of ignition hazards;
• the "optional" nature of the legislation. This has meant that Member States have been able to maintain national legislation in parallel to the Old Approach Directives.
+ Feature
of equipment was therefore considered not the best approach. In order to facilitate the freedom of movement of such products, and to provide the required flexibility for manufacturers to access the latest technical specifications, it became evident that a different type of legislation was required. The solution presented itself by combining both groups into one Directive using equipment groups and categories, essential requirements and conformity assessment procedures.
Scope of 94/9/EC
The high level of protection required under Article 100a (now 95) meant that account needed to be taken of nonelectrical as well as electrical equipment. In addition, it was considered that there was a need to harmonise systems intended to arrest a nascent explosion or at least limit its consequences to a minimum (protective systems). The Directive covers components that are essential to the safe functioning of equipment or protective systems but without any autonomous function. Likewise, devices located outside a potentially explosive atmosphere but have a direct impact on the safety of equipment inside are also covered.
The scope is also very broad in its interpretation of an "explosive atmosphere", which not only includes mixtures o~gases with air but also mixtures with air of vapours, mists or dusts.
The most important exclusions from the scope are: medical devices for use in a medical environment; equipment intended to be used specifically in the presence of explosives or unstable chemical substances; personal protective equipment; seagoing vessels and offshore mobile units; equipment solely for military use and most means of transport.
Annex 1 of the Directive defines the classification of equipment groups and categories. For the purposes of the Directive equipment, including where necessary devices and components, is divided into two groups:
Group I comprises equipment intended for use in the underground parts of mines, and to those parts of the surface parts of mines likely to become endangered by firedamp and/ or combustible dust; Group n comprises equipment intended for use in other places likely to be endangered by explosive atmospheres.
The Groups are sub-divided into Categories. The way in which these Categories are defined shows one of the main differences between Groups I and n. For Group I, the categorisation depends on (amongst other factors) whether the product is to be de-energised in the event of an explosive atmosphere occurring. For Group Il it depends on a risk evaluation of the likelihood and duration of an explosive atmosphere being present in the area where the equipment is intended 4 for use.
Annex 2 of the Directive sets out the basic general and specific requirements to be met by ATEX products in the light of the above classification. Annexes 1 and 2 therefore need to be considered in parallel.
A New Approach Directive defines Essential Health and Safety Requirements (EHSRs) that are mandatory in nature. Although the manufacturer should always have the choice of using the EHSRs, their application is usually undertaken by means of using mandated harmonised standards.
These standards relate to the design, manufacture and testing of equipment. Compliance with them enables a product to be presumed to meet the EHSRs and gives presumption ofconformity. The competent bodies for drawing up the standards are the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC). This has been the first time that these two private organisations have been called to co-operate in such a manner, to ensure absolute coherency in the standardisation work required for equipment intended for use in explosive atmospheres. The activity in the non-electrical sector is of particular importance; given thftlk is the first time mechanical equipment will fall under this specific type of legislation.
The fact that the standards are not listed in the ATEX Directive means that they can be applied (and contain the presumption of conformity) as soon as they have been published in at least one Member State. This avoids the difficulties previously experienced when updating the Old Approach Directives.
To-date thirty standards have been published under the ATEX directive as harmonised standards. Work is ongoing to develop new standards and to identifY those, for example, under the Machinery Directive that contain ignition risks and as such are suitable candidates for further work and possible publication under 94/9/EC.
Another parallel and compulsory element of the ATEX Directive are the provisions concerning the way manufacturers demonstrate the conformity of their products with the EHSRs. These are the Conformity Assessment Procedures that constitute a precaution taken prior to placing the product on the market and/or putting it into service. In order to facilitate the task of the market surveillance and monitoring authorities iD the Member States, and to take account of possible overlaps arising from regulations concerning "risks", a harmonised tool was developed, comprising a limited number of procedures applicable to the widest range of industrial products. The ATEX Directive includes most of these certification modules 5 . These procedures take the form of a hierarchy relating to the levels of protection for which the equipment is intended. Within certain limits, the choice is left to manufacturers as to whether or not to apply quality assurance systems. It should also be recognised that there is always a choice left to the manufacturer as to the procedure to apply.
As one would expect in a New Approach Directive, the ATEX Directive contains a Safeguard Clause" [Article 7(1)). Under this Article Member States are authorised to take all appropriate measures to withdraw equipment, protective systems or safety devices from the market or to restrict their free movement if they consider that goods bearing the CE marking and used in accordance with their intended use are liable to endanger the safety of persons, domestic animals or property. This action may be taken for non-compliance with the EHSRs, incorrect application of the relevant standards or shortcoming(s) in the standards themselves. If such a case arises, the Commission would enter into consultation with the parties concerned and where it considers that the action is justified, would immediately inform all other Member States. This procedure seeks to ensure transparency and to enable Member States to take action as appropriate.
If the withdrawal is based on what is considered to be a serious shortcoming in a standard, the Commission immediately informs a special committee, set up under Directive 98/34/EC6 (previously 83/189/EEC). After a detailed examination this committee prepares a decision, which (in the worst case) may be to withdraw the specification under review from the lists of harmonised standards that confer a presumption of conformity.
It should be noted that if a product is within the scope of two' directives (i.e. ATEX and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) at the same time: in general both directives have to be applied in parallel. After 30 June 2003 all products placed on the market in the European Union must be ATEX compliant regardless of country of manufacture. Existing held stock by the end user are already placed on the market, and, whilst stock are available, can be installed as they did not need to comply with the requirements of the ATEX Directive when put on market.http://europa.eu.intJ comm/enterprise/atex/q&a.htm
Timetable for Application
The last five years have seen manufacturers' awareness of the ATEX Directive greatly increase, even more so in the past few years.
The Commission, together with member States, manufacturers' associations, standardisation bodies and Notified Bodies, has not been idle. From a standing start just a few years ago, guidance is now available on the Directive. In addition to general concepts the document also provides answers to particular aspects of the Directive and its application. This, together with other useful information can be found athttp://www.europa.eu.int/cornm/enterprise/atex/ index.htm. However, as "state of the art" progresses and discussion continues, you will also want to consider this document with the latest developments discussed at the ATEX Standing Committee, which can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/atex/standcomm.htm.
ATEX 137 Directive
Article 137 (formerly Article 118a) of the Treaty establishing the European Community requires the Community "to support and complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields: improvement in particular of the working environment to protect health and safety... ". ATEX Directive I999/92/EC complements the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, in improving the safety of workers in potentially explosive atmospheres.
In common with all actions ofthe EU, directives must be Feahlre + justifiable on the basis of "Proportionality". Whilst the exact meaning of "Proportionality" is debatable, it is certain that risk reductions that could be justified on the basis that they could arguably increase the economic benefit of an operation, could never be considered disproportionate. A brief review of the costs of accidents and the potential benefits of improved risk control will demonstrate that improvements in risk management can bring economic benefits; that the existing directives implicitly contain most of the requirements of ATEX Directive 1999/92/EC; and that units compliant with the existing directives should require little or no modification. By minimising the additional cost occasioned by the implementation of the directive, the principle of proportionality is preserved. Benefits paid out by social security and insurance schemes covering accidents at work in the EU are estimated at billions of Euros per year 7 • In the UK, the Health and Safety ExecutiveS (HSE) has estimated that the indirect costs to the employer are 8 to 39 times higher than the measured direct costs. The HSE9 has further estimated that for the year 1995/96 the costs of workplace accidents and ill health were around 2% of the UK's Gross National Product. The human costs are staggering at about I in 30 of the Ell's workforce, each year, suffers an absence of 3 days or more due to occupational accidents or diseases.
Scope of 1999/92/EC
. The "Workers potentially at risk" (ATEX) Directive I999/92/EC, adopted under Article 137 EC, sets minimum legal, safety and health operations standards. These are in addition to the existing three Directives, the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, and the two mineral-extracting industries directives, 92/91/EEC & 92/1 04/EEC, that were also adopted under Article 137 EC.
The ATEX Directive 1999/92/EC applies to all workplaces other than workplaces covered by the mineralextracting industries directives, the gas burning appliances Directive 90/396/EEC, areas used for the treatment of patients, explosives and chemically unstable substances, and any means of transport governed by international agreements and not intended for use in a potentially explosive atmosphere.
The ATEX Directive 1999/92/EC sets the minimum standards for the protection of the health and safety of workers, and Member States are permitted to impose more stringent standards, if they so wish. The only restriction on the imposition of more stringent national standards is that they must not clash with other Treaty obligations, such as the provisions of directives adopted under Article 95 EC to facilitate the working of the single market, e.g. Directive 94/9/EC, and they must not disproportionately interfere with intra-community trade.
ATEX Directive 1999/92/EC requires that when carrying out their obligations under the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, employers shall assess the specific risks arising from explosive atmospheres. This assessment is to take account of, at least, the likelihood of there being an explosive atmosphere; the likelihood of there being an ignition source; possible interactions between the installation, process and substances used; and the scale of the anticipated effects. The explosion risks are to be assessed overall. The employer must then ensure that the working environment is such that work can be performed safely, Devices are defined in ATEX, roughly speaking as safe identifies a "Controller Unit" as typical equipment covered area products which contribute to safe functioning of 'equipment' or 'protective systems' in hazardous areas with respect to the risks of explosion; 'devices' by the directive. What is the definition of a controller unit? require to be certified as indicated in ATEX. There is no distinction between safety, controlling or regulating devices; the only issue is the safe functionIs it the safety barrier controlling the energy to the field or ing of the hazardous area 'equipment' or 'protective system' to which the 'device' relates; the safe functioning of the installation as a whole is not within the the process control or monitoring device? What certification scope of ATEX. An I.S. barrier meets the definition of ,device' as it resides in a safe area and contributes to the safe functioning of 'equipment' (e.g. a field and constraints are imposed on this type of equipment even instrument) in the hazardous area. Other possible examples of 'devices' requiring certification are: if it is to be located in a safe area? I) a fire & gas or ESD control panel placed on the market together with the rest of the system by a single vendor (the 'responsible person') specifically for use in a packaged product which meets the definition of 'equipment' (e.g. a gas compressor) for the safe functioning of that package; the package vendor/system integrator must carry out conformity assessment as specified by Regulation 6 of ATEX.
2) the control panel of an explosion suppression system sold as a complete system (for protecting part of an installation); this control panel must be cov-, ered in the certificate for the system. 3) a fire & gas panel controlling the ignition potential of any non-certified 'equipment' in the hazardous area by means of electrical isolations, if marketed specifically in relation to such electrical isolations of 'equipment'. Typical process control panels, process monitoring panels, fire & gas panels and ESD panels do not meet the definition of 'device' if they are provided in relation to the functioning of the overall installation; installations are not within the scope of ATEX (ATEX Guidance, 3.7.2); connected field apparatus in hazardous areas requires to be certified as appropriate as regards its own ignition potential. DSEAR Schedule 3 will allow onshore duty holders certain exceptions, subject to risk assessment.
How will the Directives affect imported explosion protect-All 'equipment', 'protective systems', 'devices' and 'components' placed on the market after 30/612003 will be required to be conformity assessed in comed equipment from the USA currently accepted by the UK pliance with ATEX, as will 'eqUipment', 'protective systems' and 'devices' put into service after 30/612003. US manufacturers can follow the appropriate authorities for installation offshore? The equipment I refer conformity assessment procedures, and this would be the appropriate course of action for US products that are manufactured in quantity and used widely to would be that approved by FM. in the EU. [Where certification must be done by a 3rd party rather than the manufacturer, one of the Notified Bodies from an EU member state must be used.] If the equipment is imported directly from outside the EU, without going through any EU agent, the user takes on responsibility for ensuring compliance with ATEX. Note that although DSEAR requires users to ensure that equipment and protective systems are selected for the given zone, DSEAR Schedule 3 will allow onshore duty holders certain exceptions where the risk assessment indicates. For example, the risk assessment might conclude that ATEX category 3 equipment was acceptable in a zone I area because some other protective system provides an equivalent level of safety, but it is less likely that HSE would accept non-ATEX compliant equipment (that does create an ignition risk) being used in a hazardous area. Bringing into service of non-ATEX equipment. Will the After 30/6/2003, any new 'equipment', 'protective system' or 'device' must comply with ATEX when put into service, Le. each and every individual produser who first brings a non ATEX item into service be uct put into service must be declared as called for by ATEX. [Note that second-hand products imported into the EU are generally considered to be new responsible for ATEX Certification of the item? (ATEX guidance, chapter 7).] Where a user first puts into service an individual product, this duty creates no responsibility for, and does not imply, the generic compliance of other products of the same type, even if identical. Would an instrument panel manufactured to a specific one-Refer to ATEX Guidelines Table I (http://europa.eu.int/comrn/enterprise/atexlguide/guide_en.pdf off specification for installation in a particular hazardous area need to be ATEX conformity assessed where the panel is to be supplied fitted with ATEX compliant electronic or electrical items and other items that do not require ATEX conformity such as pressure gauges? Is it the case that spares for equipment installed that were Many spares, for example engineering parts, perhaps for example bearings, are not considered to be ATEX products, and as such are outwith the scope of certified against the pre-ATEX regime and that are actually the EPS. In addition, products physically held by the user or his agent are usually considered to be 'in service', and those placed on the market prior to held by the user or his agent prior to the 30th June, who may 1/7/2003 are outwith the scope ofEPS. Only where a 'spare' is an equipment, protective system, device or component as defined by EPS and requiring conor not be the OEM, can continue to be used without limit of formity assessment in its own right (e.g. an entire spare Ex motor) might different considerations arise, and eveh then, only for items placed on the mar- and that there is appropriate supervision. In addition, the employer must ensure that the places where explosive atmospheres can occur are classified into zones in accordance with Annex I of the directive, and must draw up and maintain an 'explosion protection document'. The Explosion Protection Document of the ATEX Directive, 1999/92/EC, must firstly show the hazardous zones and areas containing equipment required for the safe operation of equipment in the hazardous zones. Secondly it must demonstrate that the explosion risks have been fully detennined and assessed. Thirdly it must demonstrate that the workplace and work equipment are designed, operated, and maintained with due regard for safety; and that arrangements have been made for the safe use of work equipment. Annex 1 of the directive prescribes the classification of places where explosive atmospheres can occur as follows:
• Zone 0, or 20: a place where an explosive atmosphere due to a cloud of combustible gas, vapour, mist or dust in air is present continuously, or for long periods, or frequently.
• Zone 1, or 21: a place where an explosive atmosphere due to a cloud of combustible gas, vapour, mist or dust in air is present only occasionally during nonnal operations.
• Zone 2, or 22: a place where an explosive atmosphere consisting of a cloud of combustible gas, vapour, mist or dust in air is not likely to occur in normal operations but, if it does occur, will persist for a short period or1J.y.
A single figure zone refers to a riskfrom gas, vapour or mist, whilst a double figure zone refers to a risk arising from dust.
These zones correlate with the equipment categories of Directive, 94/9/EC. For Zones 0 or 20, only category I equipment may be used. For Zones I or 21, only category I or 2 equipment may be used. For Zones 2 or 22, only category I, 2 or 3 equipment may be used.
Although it is not strictly a prescriptive requirement, ATEX Directive 1999/92/EC requires the hazardous zones to be marked by the sign given in Annex III, where necessary. Likewise, written instructions and pennits to work should be used, where required by the explosion protection document. It is likely that the placing of signs in all "zoned" areas, and the use of "pennits to work" will become the nonn.
One concern that has been often expressed is whether equipment and spare parts not complying with Directive 94/9/EC can be used after 30 June 2003. Insofar as the ATEX 1999/92/EC directive is concerned the relevant requirement appears in Annex 28: " Ifthe explosion protection document based on a risk assessment does not state otherwise, equipment and protective systems for all places in which explosiveaJt1:ldipheres may occur must be selected on the basis of the categories set out in Directive 9419IEC". The important point to note here is that if safety is assured, then the explosion protection document may say otherwise and permit the use of equipment and parts not strictly compliant with Directive 94/9/EC. This will be of particular interest to those industries that need to use specialised equipment commonly obtained from North America. Note it is worth pointing out that this in no way affects the duties of "responsible persons" under the ATEX Equipment Directive. Equipment from the USA, imported and used in Europe, will still need to be ATEX compliant, and the "responsiFeature + ble person", be it the manufacturer, supplier or importer, will be required to comply with the Directive. In practice this will severely limit any leeway the end-user may have to select non-compliant equipment (as it will not be available).
A similar problem arises over the connection of new equipment into existing systems, etc. Unless the explosion protection document states otherwise, the new equipment will have to comply with the relevant category set out in Directive 94/9/EC. The old equipment may not be compliant, but the existing equipment directives do set high standards for safety. Great care will have to be taken over the interface between the two sets of equipment, and all possible interactions, including those under upset conditions, must be considered. So long as the risk analyses show that the results are safe, there is no reason in the directives why such connections cannot be made.
The introduction of the new directives on I July 2003 is unlikely to require modifications to, or changes in, working practice for equipment already in service on that date. This assumes that the existing equipment and working practices fully comply with the earlier legislation.
Another problem has been the requirement in ATEX Directive I999/92/EC, Annex 11, Section 2.1 for the diversion or removal to a safe place of any unintentional escape of a gas, vapour, aerosol, or combustible dusts that could give rise to an explosion hazard. This requirement is compulsory and can only be avoided if it is not practicable. This is a higher than usual obligation that goes beyond the usual requirements of proportionality. If, however, a thorough risk analysis has been undertaken on the existing machinery and working practices it is likely that the implementation of the new directives wit! require little further action to be taken.
It must be emphasised, however, that directives should be applied according to the rules of the legal interpretation employed in the VI(, DSEAR regulation.
The "Equipment" Directive, 94/9/EC, Annex 11, Sections 2.1.1, et al require that for all categories of equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres "sources of ignition do not become active, even in rare incidents relating to equipment". This gives rise to an interesting problem concerning large industrial prime movers, such as gas turbines. Most industrial gas turbines are supplied with gas, or liquid fuel under such pressure that it would quickly form an explosive atmosphere if the supply pipework ruptured. When this is combined with the normal practice of running the combustion chambers for gas turbines very hot (i.e. above auto-ignition temperature), we have a problem. It is to be noted that in the UKCS, over a 5.5 year interval, there were 85 fuel incidents associated with gas turbines offshore IO , of which 52 were fires and 4 explosions.
To totally ban the use of industrial gas turbines would not be proportionate Jl . Insulating the hot areas to totally isolate them from the potential explosive atmosphere is very difficult to guarantee, will raise the internal temperatures, and could lead to severe problems. With the requirement in Directive 1999/92/EC for the diversion or removal to a safe place ofany unintentional escape ofa gas, vapour, aerosol, one possible answer would be to ensure that therc is a large, reliable source of ventilation. This would have to be large enough and reliable enough to ensure that the escaping fuel goes from above the upper explosive limit to below the lower explosive limit very rapidly. [n this way we would restrict the problem to a flammable jet, not an explosive atmosphere. Although there would remain a very small possibility of an explosive atmosphere occurring, it would be against the spirit of the Directive to insist on applying the strictest possible interpretation of the wording. This is only an example, and describes only one way of remaining within the requirements of the directive; there will most probably be many other ways.
This Directive must be read in conjunction with other Directives, such as the "Equipment" Directive, 94/9/EC, for the true scope of the new legislative regime to be understood. The thrust of the Directive is to ensure that the underlying hazards are eliminated whenever possible, that the risks arising from the residual hazards are minimised at source, and that these minimised risks are properly controlled by good management practices.
Conclusions
The affects of the two ATEX Directives will be different for existing workplaces and new workplaces, and for onshore and offshore installations. Existing workplaces will have the legacy of how to manage future equipment failures and their "sparepa~anagement, which may include extensive engineering and product loss before resolution to UK regulations. Whilst future new installed workplaces will be fully compliant. The hybrid plant of an extension to existing plants could introduce interchangeability issues.
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